INTRODUCTION
It is indisputable that safeguarding human life is a key aspect of human rights in general 1 and the European Convention on Human Rights 2 in particular. 3 The negative and positive obligations emanating from the right to life, encompassed in Article 2 of the ECHR, have been the subject of extensive interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights, 4 and have reflected a long-standing, profound commitment to protecting human life. Moreover, the Court has reiterated the centrality of the value of human freedom throughout its rich jurisprudence on the Convention, and this has underpinned the extensive safeguards it has elaborated in the context of criminal justice and beyond. An examination of the circumstances in which the ECtHR imposes a positive obligation on States to criminalise and pursue criminal forms of redress, however, indicates that the Court's doctrine carries the potential of both coercive overreach and dilution of the right to life itself, at the expense of the protection of both human life and human freedom. These substantive problems are compounded by opacity in the Court's pronouncements. This article pursues principled coherence in ECtHR doctrine, on the understanding that the law -including human rights law -'speaks' with integrity. 5 My 4 Article 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life in the following terms:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Article 2(2) sets out circumstances in which force resulting in the loss of life, whether death is intended or not, can be justified and found lawful. 9 Moreover, Article 15 of the ECHR, which governs the circumstances in which States may derogate from certain Convention rights in times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, provides that '[n]o derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war…shall be made under this provision'. This arguably allows a window for lawful killings governed by the applicable jus in bello, 10 yet this has not been examined in any depth in the Court's substantive doctrine so far.
11 9 As regards Article 2(1), note that the death penalty is now proscribed across the Council of Europe in accordance with Protocols 6 and 13 of the ECHR; the ECtHR also found the death penalty to be contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR in Al Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 9. 6 Article 2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out those circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, to which no derogation is permitted. Together with Article 3, it also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified must therefore be strictly construed. The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings also requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective…
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Because of the right's fundamental character, the circumstances in which the State may lawfully take life must be strictly construed. Additionally, Article 2 is to be interpreted and applied in a way which renders it effective as a means to safeguard human life, a point which is foundational to the establishment of an array of positive obligations to protect the right to life.
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The negative and positive obligations emanating from the right to life are thus in principle meant to be both substantively stringent and rigorously applied. Yet the intersection between the negative obligation not to use lethal force except in very narrowly delimited criminal law generates a conundrum, 19 which has materialised in a problematic form in ECtHR doctrine, as the analysis below demonstrates.
THE 'NO MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY' TEST
State action which takes life is approached with stringency in principle by the ECtHR. The negative obligation to refrain from taking life encompasses a duty not to kill intentionally and a duty not to use (potentially) lethal force. 20 Recall that, per ECtHR doctrine, the circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified -where absolutely necessary (a) in defence of someone from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a lawfully detained person; or (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection 21 -must be strictly construed. 22 The Court has clarified that '[t]he use of the term "absolutely necessary"…indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary in a democratic society" under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention…'. 23 This affirms that the 'no more than absolutely necessary' test is more stringent than the proportionality test applicable in respect of Convention rights which allow 19 For an instructive account of the paradoxes inherent in the relationship between human rights and criminal law, see F. Tulkens, 'The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights' (2011) 25 In effect, despite the broader set of circumstances outlined in Article 2(2), the Court will tend not to find the use of (potentially) lethal force -such as shooting an individual in the chest or head -absolutely necessary except where the person against whom force is exerted is posing a serious threat to someone's bodily integrity. 26 The Court's approach in Leonidis, concerning an arrest, captures this point:
[T]he legitimate aim of effecting a lawful arrest can only justify putting human life at risk in circumstances of absolute necessity. The Court considers that in principle there can be no such necessity where it is known that the person to be arrested poses no threat to life or limb and is not suspected of having committed a violent offence, even if refraining from using lethal force may result in the opportunity to arrest the fugitive being lost.
27
The above passage indicates that a palpable threat to life or bodily integrity must be present for force capable of killing to be justifiably used to repel such threat. This is the result of applying the absolute necessity test in determining whether potentially lethal force is warranted, or excessive, in the circumstances.
28
The seminal case of McCann established an important facet of the absolute necessity assessment, which effectively amounts to a structural extension of the negative obligation:
In keeping with the importance of this provision (art. 2) in a democratic society, To elaborate on the example of self-defence, proportionate self-defence in a criminal context will often allow for leeway in assessing the reaction of the person acting in self-defence, as she 'cannot reasonably be expected to make precise judgments'. 72 This is crucial: the determination of individual criminal culpability appropriately encompasses a subjective element -for instance, a subjective belief as to the type and degree of danger posed to the defendant by the victim -and/or a significant degree of leeway in the objective criterion applied, such as that of proportionality. Uniacke argues thus:
Someone who maintains that exact proportionality would be discernable to a suitably informed impartial observer in a calm frame of mind could concede some leeway in practice given the pressures on the actor in the situation. A familiar legal specification that self-defense must not be 'substantially disproportionate' would be consistent with such a view, for instance.
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The stringent absolute necessity test elaborated by the Court in relation to the negative obligation under Article 2 ECHR is clearly not modelled on a criminal law standard of liability for homicide. The standard for State responsibility for human rights breaches can appropriately be and is stricter, demanding more from the State. This position is premised not only on the significant value placed on human life under human rights law, which requires that the State show a particularly high regard for human life, but also on the context in which the State obligation is located, namely the distribution of power: Article 2 operates on the presumption that, in contexts in which the State's agents may resort to force capable of being lethal, it is they -rather than their potential targets -who hold the superior capacity to kill but also to react 72 S. Uniacke, ''Proportionality and Self-defense ' (2011) Unfortunately, the way this prospect has been 'remedied' or tempered has been through the ECtHR's dilution of the absolute necessity test itself, as I argue below.
At this juncture, I should note that the proper relationship between breaches of the right to life by omission and criminal liability is even murkier, but space does not permit me to focus on this aspect of the ECtHR's doctrine.
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Turning to coercive overreach as a matter of the Court's institutional remit, it is worth emphasising that, as with the above, the analysis below strikes a note of caution rather than being a conclusive pronouncement of the mutation of the ECtHR's role. The ECtHR has certainly not cast itself as a supranational criminal court, where persons are tried and convicted in the style of international criminal tribunals. Nonetheless, its tendency to seek punitive redress and its occasional apparent endorsement of arguments equating Article 2 breaches with criminal offences via positive obligations is bordering on supranational criminal law-making.
Its doctrine on redress is coming close to demanding that particular acts and omissions are criminalised and/or that criminal procedures and redress mechanisms are set in motion in a number of circumstances. Given that, in its adjudicatory function, the ECtHR has to pronounce on how such demands are applied to concrete facts, it might unduly come to resemble a supranational criminal tribunal, a role which it has neither the authority nor the institutional 88 Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the Court's demand for the pursuit of criminal redress in circumstances such as those at play in Öneryıldız (n 61) might fail to appropriately delineate the circumstances in which failure to act warrants individual criminal liability, even in the context of a potentially dangerous activity. See the seminal account of some of the issues arising in this area in A. Attempts to do either will be institutionally, and insofar as they seek to establish criminal offences replicating human rights breaches, potentially substantively, problematic.
The problem is that the ECtHR has not entirely heeded these normative fundamentals.
Rather, three manifestations of the Court's tendency towards coercive overreach can be distilled from the doctrine as analysed above. 94 Da Silva (n 6), para 282.
Dilution
Coercive overreach is nonetheless not the only problematic aspect of these developments. The blurring of the boundaries between State responsibility for human rights breaches and individual criminal liability in ECtHR doctrine on Article 2 also pulls the ECtHR in another dangerous direction, and one which has already materialised: the dilution of the right to life itself. Having made criminalisation central to the implications of (some) breaches of the right to life and effectively come close to equating State liability with individual criminal liability, the Court has simultaneously taken to applying a criminal-law-styled standard of culpability to finding a breach of the right to life by the State. In this way, the absolute necessity test, proclaimed to be so stringent in principle, is significantly diluted.
The way this has occurred is as follows. After pronouncing that only circumstances of absolute necessity can justify the use of lethal force on the stringent principles set out above, the ECtHR proceeds to assess the State agent's use of such force through an 'honest belief' test:
The use of force by agents of the state in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in para.2 of art.2 of the Convention may be justified under this provision where it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken.
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This test of 'honest belief' is not only applied to the State agent's assessment of the danger at issue, but also to their choice of reaction. It can therefore play a decisive role not only in assessing the necessity of using force to repel an attack on one of the grounds outlined in Article 98 Giuliani (n 30) para 178. See also McCann (n 23) para 200.
2(2), but also in determining the absolute necessity -which requires force to be both necessary and strictly proportionate to the threat at issue -of the use of lethal force. Whilst the quoted excerpt indicates an objective element within the Court's assessment, with 'honest belief' being circumscribed by the 'for good reasons' criterion, the case law shows a readiness to find that mistaken beliefs legitimise the use of lethal force in circumstances which objectively did not disclose an absolute necessity to use lethal force or even any objectively good reasons to do so.
Equating the breach of Article 2 with criminal liability, Da Silva cements this, with the ECtHR's Grand Chamber stating that 'the existence of "good reasons" should be determined subjectively' 99 and suggesting that 'the Court has not treated reasonableness as a separate requirement but rather as a relevant factor in determining whether a belief was honestly and genuinely held', 100 referencing prior case law in which this approach had been effectively adopted if not explicitly affirmed, such as Bubbins v UK.
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In Bubbins, a police-officer shot and killed an unarmed man who was mistaken for an intruder in his own home and appeared to be aiming a weapon from the window of his flat towards police-officers surrounding it. The substantive complaint on Article 2 grounds was that there had been a breach of Article 2 both in the actions of the officer who shot and killed the man, and in the overall planning and control of the operation which led to the use of lethal force which was not absolutely necessary. The Court applied the 'honest belief' test both on the question of whether the victim posed a danger and on the question whether it was (absolutely) necessary to respond to this danger by opening fire: 'The Court sees no reason to doubt that Officer B honestly believed that his life was in danger and that it was necessary to open fire on Michael Fitzgerald in order to protect himself and his colleagues.' 102 The Court 99 Da Silva (n 6) para 247.
suggested that '[t]o hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the State and its law-enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and the lives of others'. 103 It also indicated that 'detached from the events at issue, it cannot substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of an officer who was required to react in the heat of the moment to avert an honestly perceived danger to his life', 104 before concluding that 'the use of lethal force in the circumstances of this case, albeit highly 107 Giuliani (n 30).
noticeable errors and questionable decisions made in the conduct of the operation, it would seem that the Court will require an extremely high level of error, ineptitude or bad judgement before it will find a breach of Art.2'.
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Attesting further to the problem of dilution is the case of Giuliani. In Giuliani,
concerning an anti-globalisation protester who was shot by a carabiniero when a jeep carrying three carabinieri was surrounded by violent protesters including the victim during the G8 summit in Genoa, the Court reasoned similarly to Bubbins through the 'honest belief' test.
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Applying it both to the question of whether circumstances called for force and the question of whether the force ultimately used by the carabiniero -shooting blindly from the jeep -was strictly proportionate to the risk posed, 112 it found no violation of Article 2. The court also found the organisational deficiencies which resulted in three highly inexperienced carabinieri armed with only lethal weapons at their disposal being surrounded by protesters in the context of a pre-planned, highly securitised event -the G8 summit -not to fall foul of its stringent standards in minimising the likelihood of loss of life. 113 Cementing the 'national security'-styled deference, the Court shrank back from a stringent application of the absolute necessity test, seen holistically to encompass the organisational aspect of the policing. Noting the Court's finding that 'distinction has to be made between cases where the law-enforcement agencies are dealing with a precise and identifiable target…and those where the issue is the maintenance of order in the face of possible disturbances spread over an area as wide as an entire city, as in the instant case', 114 Skinner suggests that, '[e]stablishing an apparent "urban guerrilla" exception, the essential point here is that the Court is prepared to distinguish among types of threat and 110 ibid.
111 Giuliani (n 30) para 178.
reduce its standards-or increase state leeway-based on the scale, complexity and foreseeability of the incident in question'. 115 More recently, such 'exceptionalism' was translated, in the mass-hostage crisis case of Finogenov, to an explicit application of a margin of appreciation in determining whether the test of 'absolute necessity' had been fulfilled in State agents' use of a poisonous gas to address a hostage situation.
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The Court can and should approach the question of whether there has been a breach of the negative obligation under Article 2 differently, clarifying that State liability is distinct from individual (civil or criminal) liability -and Da Silva highlights the need to do so urgently.
Absolute necessity represents an objective standard of assessment, and not one of which only an extremely high level of error, ineptitude or bad judgement would fall foul. Whilst the subjective perception of the perpetrator may suitably play a role in determining individual criminal liability, Article 2 makes it clear that the right to life is violated where a person has been killed in circumstances where lethal force used against her was not absolutely necessary; the standard is not whether the person inflicting such force considered it, in good faith, to be (absolutely) necessary.
Thus, the objective criterion ought to take centre stage in a human rights assessment; whilst individual criminal liability may appropriately be carved through a an assessment of subjective perception and intent -an assessment which only a full Article 6-compliant criminal trial can provide and for which the ECtHR itself is not equipped -the State's responsibility for unnecessary takings of life is appropriately to be assessed by considering whether the circumstances created an objective basis for using force, amongst those outlined in Article 2(2), and whether they gave rise to an absolute necessity to use (potentially) lethal force. Moreover, in State killings, the superior competence and knowledge of the State should burden rather than 'absolve' the State, and the onus to show that the force used was absolutely necessary should lie with the State, which is likely to -and indeed under an investigative obligation to -be in possession of the relevant facts.
Uncertainty
Compounding the above problems, the Court's doctrine is characterised by opacity. The case law lacks clarity on matters which tend to attract considerable nuance in domestic legislation and case law across States.
There is therefore considerable uncertainty for norm-appliers and, crucially, for individuals, including both potential perpetrators and potential victims. This is a failure to respect the rule of law, which demands clarity and predictability in the law; 119 it is especially troubling given that the Court's doctrine in this area of human rights comes with the demand for the deployment of criminal law redress mechanisms. Greater clarity and guidance from the Court is crucial if the fundamental tenets of the rule of law and individual autonomy are to be respected by the very system that claims to uphold them -and the ECtHR has certainly vaunted the Convention system as doing so.
A WAY FORWARD: TAKING LIFE AND LIBERTY SERIOUSLY
The ECtHR's doctrine in this area can be salvaged. In this section, I propose a way forward which takes both the centrality of safeguarding human life and the normative limits to deploying the coercive force of the criminal law seriously.
As regards the substantive issues arising from the unravelling of the Court's doctrine, I
propose the following. ought to be rejected. The more general implication is that seeking harmonisation of (parts of) the criminal law via human rights -and particularly via supranational human rights courtswould be ill-thought, both for the criminal law, insofar as a restrictive and autonomy-orientated approach to criminal wrong-doing is seen to be desirable, and for human rights themselves.
These conclusions are instructive also for the anti-impunity agenda in human rights.
Whilst there may be some scope for supranational human rights courts legitimately to demand accountability through criminal redress for international crimes which amount to grave human rights violations, 141 this article highlights the dangers of such courts overstepping their 137 See Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (n 51) chapters 4 and 6.
138 Da Silva (n 6) para 284; see also paras 282-288. 
